Project Artichoke
31 Jan 1975
Transcript:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Project ARTICHOKE
ARTICHOKE is the Agency cryptonym for the study and/or use of "special" interrogation methods and techniques. These "special" interrogation methods have been known to include the use of drugs and chemicals, hypnosis, and "total isolation," a form of psycological harassment.
A review of available file information obtained from Office of Security resources failed to reflect a comprehensive or complete picture of the ARTICHOKE program as participated in by the Office of Security. Fragmentary information contained in a variety of files previously maintained by the Security Research Staff (SRS) reflected several basic papers which described, in general terms, the program known as ARTICHOKE. Information contained therein indicated that prior to 1952, the Office of Security had studied the use of drugs and chemicals in "unconventional interrogation." These studies were evidently coordinated with the Agency unit which was then called OSI. OSI at that time apparently was the coordinating unit within CIA.
One paper reflected that an Office of Security team as early as 1949-50 experimented with drugs and hypnosis under a project called BLUEBIRD. This paper also reflected that by 1951 actual interrogations utilizing drugs were conducted by a combined team of Office of Security and Office of Medical Services personnel, but few details were available.
File information indicated that in 1952, overall responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE passed from OSI to the Office of Security. References to operational use of drugs as an aid to interrogation since that time were found in various files, but few details concerning these experiments wwere reflected. A memorandum, subject title: Project ARTICHOKE, dated 21 November 1952, by Mr. Sheffield EDWARDS, reflected transfer of control of Project ARTICHOKE from OSI to the Office of Security. The memorandum indicated that I&SO (Office of Security) should call upon the research and support facilities of the CIA Medical Staff and the Office of Technical Services as required. Responsibility for the evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects of the project were to remain with OSI.
The unit within the Office of Security which apparently coordinated Project Artichoke activities was SRS, with Mr. [REDACTED] for many years the focal point. Details of Office of Security involvement. in individual Project Artichoke operational utilizations were found in very few instances. A reference in an SRS log (1951-67) reflected, however, that SRS had been involved in the experimentation and use of hypnosis "from the start." In the same reference, it was stated that "SRS has examined and investigated numerous unusual techniques of interrogation including psychological harassment and such matters as 'total isolation'." The SRS log referred to above, which covered a period from 1951 to 1967, indicated that, as of 1967, the term ARTICHOKE is not in general use now, and drug interrogation is conducted from the recommendation of an Agency committee of which the Chief, SRS, is the Office of Security representative." No record was found which reflected when or if overall responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE was transferred from the Office of Security to any other Agency component.
One of the few areas where detailed information was available was concerned with hypnotic experimentations. A log of hypnotic experiments conducted by Office of Security personnel was reviewed. The log reflected that numerous (probably several hundred) experiments with hypnotism were conducted in Agency buildings, apparently utilizing the staff employee volunteers as subjects. In some instances, representatives from Agency components other than the Office of Security were present. The log reflected hypnotic experimentations during 1951, 1952, and 1953. It could not be determined from available file information when the hypnotic experiments actually began or were caused to be ceased. No record was located which reflected hypnosis utilized as an actual operational tool in the field. In connection with hypnotism, it appears that SRS utilized an Agency employee, one [Redacted] , as an informant in various societies dealing with hypnotism to keep abreast of current developments in the field.
Few references were found pertaining to the area of "total isolation" as an interrogation aid. A memorandum pertaining to this subject, dated 21 March 1955, was written by Mr. [Redacted] of SRS to the Director of Security. The paper discussed "total isolation" techniques as an operational tool of potential. Another paper (a storilized version, propably written by an element of the Department of Defense) dated 16 March 1955, reflected the results of "total isolation" experiments on six volunteers, all members of the U.S. military. No reference was found to any additional experiments in this field, nor was any reference found which reflected actual use of this technique in an operational situation.
As far as the experimentation and/or utilization of various drugs is concerned, references to a few instances were located, but little detail was available, and it was clear from the files that much of the detailed information probably was maintained by Agency units other than the Office of Security, i.e., the Office of Medical Services and the Office of Technical Services.
Among the instances where details were located in which drugs were used in an operational environment under the auspices of Project ARTICHOKE, were the following:
(a) In 1954 three subjects were interrogated by a Project ARTICHOKE team utilizing drugs of an unspecified nature. The three subjects were identified as [REDACTED] , [REDACTED] , and [REDACTED] in a memorandum dated 13 January 1955, with a cover sheet signed by Mr. [REDACTED] . The interrogations took place in [REDACTED] , and the memorandum mentioned injections of "solution #1" and "solution #2," but these drugs were not further identified. It was noted in the memorandum that the cases were handled "under straight drug techniques -- hypnosis or narco-hypnosis was not attempted."
(b) A memorandum dated 20 January 1959 to Mr. [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] indicated that a field request had been made for a "P-1 interrogation." The writer [REDACTED] identified a "P-1 interrogation" as one using LSD. Approval was granted on 27 January 1959 by the initials [REDACTED], presumably Mr. [REDACTED] . No further reference to the case could be found, thus no details were available.
[End Page 3]
(c) A series of cables between [REDACTED] and Headquarters in 1955 requested ARTICHOKE interrogations for nine persons. No disposition in this instance was found, however, a transmittal slip affixed to the materials dated in 1960 indicated that the ARTICHOKE interrogations probably did not actually take place in [REDACTED] at that time.
(d) A memo contained in the security file of [REDACTED] reflected that an ARTICHOKE team was dispatched to [REDACTED] in June 1952 to conduct ARTICHOKE interrogations on [REDACTED]. No further reference to this operation was noted, and no disposition could be found.
(e) In the case of [REDACTED] , [REDACTED] operation in [REDACTED] drugs were utilized in the interrogation which took place i-[REDACTED] . Again, details of the operation were not available. However, an interview with the Office of Security representative who participated in the interrogation revealed that a form of LSD was used in this instance. In this case, approval was granted by Headquarters for the ARTICHOKE interrogation. A memorandum dated 6 July 1960, signed by Mr.[REDACTED] , Deputy Director of Security, reflected that approval for use of drugs in this case was granted at a meeting of the Drug Committee on 1 July 1960 and cabled to [REDACTED] .
As stated earlier, little detail was available in file information concerning the conduct of actual cases utilizing Project ARTICHOKE techniques. It appears obvious, however, that the few cases noted above were only a small part of the actual utilization of ARTICHOKE techniques in the field. For one thing, almost no information was available for the period prior to 1952, so that Project BLUEBIRD experiments and operations were not noted specifically. In addition, annual reports of accomplishments found in SRS log materials reflected a substantial amount of activity in the Project ARTICHOKE area. The review for 1953-1954 stated in part that SRS had "dispatched an ARTICHOKE team for permanent location in an overseas area." The review for 1954-1955 stated in part that SRS conducted numerous ARTICHOKE experiments and "prepared and dispatched an ARTICHOKE team to an overseas area to handle a number of sensitive cases."
[END PAGE 4]
Review of file materials consistently reflected that the Office of Security exercised caution in the utilization of drugs under the ARTICHOKE Program. Although it is apparent that SRS for a number of years was engaged with certain other Agency components in research and operational work with hallucinogenic drugs, the work was apparently conducted under strict controls. As previously stated, no information pertaining to when or if control of Project ARTICHOKE was transferred from the Office of Security to another Agency component was located. Apparently, SRS at one time maintained an inventory of ARTICHOKE materials which contained numerous drugs of all types including LSD-25. A memorandum dated 14 October 1957 requested authorization for SRS to transfer ARTICHOKE materials and apparatus to Dr. E-[REDACTED] of Medical Services. The memorandum was written by Mr. [REDACTED] and approval to transfer the materials was granted by Mr. [REDACTED] on 17 October 1957.
In the review of file information contained in SRS materials, one incident which occurred in November 1953 appears worthy of note. Although it was not clear from file information whether or not the incident occurred under the auspices of Project ARTICHOKE, the incident did involve use of LSD in an experimental exercise. One Frank OLSON , a civilian employee of the Department of the Army, committed suicide a week or so after having been administered LSD by an Agency representative. Details concerning this incident apparently will be reported in a separate memorandum, but it appears that the drug was administered to several unwitting subjects by a Dr. GOTTLIEB, at that time a branch chief in TSS (now OTS). A short time after the LSD was administered, the subjects were told that they had been given LSD. On the day following the experiment, OLSON began to behave in a peculiar and erratic manner and was lager placed under the care of a psychiatrist. A few days later, OLSON crashed through a window in a New York hotel in an apparent suicide.
A memorandum dated 1 December 1953 from the IG Staff caused the impoundment of all LSD materials. Information contained in the above mentioned files reflected that the drug had been administered without the prior knowledge or approval of the Office of Security or the Office of Medical Services.
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It should be noted that the information contained herein is based on resources available within the Office of Security only, and no effort has been made to delve into files of other Agency units such as the Office of Medical Services or the Office of Technical Services. As the reader is by now acutely aware, insufficient information was available to provide a clear understanding of either Project BLUEBIRD or Project ARTICHOKE. Investigative efforts reflected that numerous files and collected data had been routinely purged or destroyed in the normal course of events at some time in the past.
[end of transcript]
Source: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/PROJECT ARTICHOKE[12888369].pdf
ARTICHOKE MEMORANDUM OF 2 [12884943]
SUBJECT: ARTICHOKE Team Assignment
REFERENCE: ARTICHOKE Memorandum of 26 November 1953
GENERAL STATEMENT
In accordance with basic ARTICHOKE memorandum dated 26 November 1952 and in accordance with policy approved by all members of the ARTICHOKE Conference [REDACTED], an ARTICHOKE team is to be assigned to [REDACTED] on or about 1 January 1954.
MISSION
The ARTICHOKE Team hereinafter referred to as the Team will:
A. Offer operational support to [REDACTED] and all [REDACTED] Field Stations in the handling of specific cases using ARTICHOKE methods and techniques.
B. Conduct research and experimentation along ARTICHOKE lines using available subjects and material, both from an offensive and defensive view point.
TEAM
The Team will consist of [REDACTED] who will be in charge and [REDACTED] , technician. In addition, SO Washington will send [REDACTED] for a period of six months (or less) on TDY to work jointly with [REDACTED] on ARTICHOKE problems and research.
RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING ARTICHOKE TEAM
The Team will carry out ARTICHOKE operations in accordance with instructions and directions as to techniques and methods as prescribed by Headquarters Washington will full allowances made for problems arising in the Field and with sufficient latitude given to permit a flexible and intelligent operation.
The Team will for all administrative matters and for operational control be attached to the Office of the Chief of Security, [REDACTED] and will be directly responsibility responsible [REDACTED] . The Team will function only upon consent of-[REDACTED] or his representative. Furthermore, no operational work or research will be carried out without exact consent or authorization from the Chief of Mission or his Deputy or otherwise designated responsible officer. No operational work or research will be carried out without exact consent or authorization of the Chief of Station of his Deputy or other designated responsible officer. If work is contemplated outside of-[REDACTED]-or th-[REDACTED]-areas. It will be the responsibility of the Chief of Security, [REDACTED] to arrange upon the arrival of the Team in-[REDACTED] office and operating areas and storage equipment space for Team material and supplies. [REDACTED] will also arrange for Team members to formally brief all Head Offices in the ARTICHOKE work where their duties will require knowledge of or use of the ARTICHOKE techniques. Furthermore, [REDACTED] will himself (or assign a member of his Staff) take the Team members to all stations within the [REDACTED] areas for the purpose of briefing each sat station chief and certain of his associates on the ARTICHOKE techniques, requirements, etc.
REPORTS
The team will permit submit reports (in writing) of all operational support cases handled and of all research and experimentation conducted. Case reports will include specific detail the techniques, methods, etc. used, chemicals, doseages, results (information obtained), etc. Those reports will be submitted to [REDACTED] and will be forwarded thereafter to Headquarters Washington through proper channels. Special report forms will be furnished the Team to insure uniform reporting, statistics, etc.
Basically, the report will consist of two main sections. The first will give a narrative description of the case in fulldd full detail with results and the second will be a clinical report stating in specific detail the various items such as time elements, specific dosages, physical condition, etc.
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
Team supplies will be of two types: A) technical and B) medical. Technical electronic, mechanical and photographic supplies will be obtained at Headquarters Washington and forwarded directly to [REDACTED] through proper channels (air pouch). Specific items of necessary technical equipment will be determined by Team members with the advice and assistance of [REDACTED] of Headquarters Staff. Medical supplies will be obtained in the field locally through [REDACTED] connections. Special medical supplies (including unusual chemicals, etc.) will be obtained through the Medical Office, Headquarters Washington and either hand carried to the field by members, if this can be arranged, or shipped via air pouch.
MEMORANDUM FOR: ARTICHOKE COMMITTEE
It is recommended that the following form and content be accepted and approved as being the Aims and Responsibilities in the ARTICHOKE program.
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The Director of Security shall be responsible for the ARTICHOKE program.
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The aims of the ARTICHOKE program are as follows
a. To perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis and other elements for the extraction of information from individuals whether willing or not.
b. To explore means through research indoctrination and training for preventing the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental capacities of Agency personnel.
c. When necessary and consistent with Agency policy and operational security, support CIA operations through the use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
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The following responsibilities and functions will apply to the ARTICHOKE program:
a. The Director of Security will be responsible for the general direction, administration, and execution of the ARTICHOKE aims as defined in 2.a, -b and -c, above.
b. The Director of Security will provide field teams for testing, experimenting and refining techniques utilizing currently known and recommended new materials for the extraction of information from indigenous personnel under field conditions.
c. The Director of Security will arrange, in coordination with [REDACTED] and the Medical Staff, for research and experimentation within the facilities of those two components for the development of means for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not.
d. The Director of Security will conduct liaison and research in fields and areas not within the immediate capabilities of [REDACTED] and the Medical Staff for the development of ideas and possible means of exerting control over the activities and mental capacities of individuals.
e. The Director of Security will control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve as the support element to all operational components in the use of such techniques.
f. The Director of Security will serve as the coordinating element among all components for the Agency on those matters concerning the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
g. The Director of Security will arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE techniques and research and development among those elements primarily concerned as OSI, [REDACTED] Medical Division, [REDACTED] and Security Office.
h. The Director of Security will conduct authorized liaison with other components of government in the ARTICHOKE field and arrange for liaison responsibility through the Agency component having the most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in other departments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.
MEMORANDUM TO: ARTICHOKE Representatives
FROM: Director of Security
SUBJECT: ARTICHOKE; Restatement of Program
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Reference is made to memorandum dated 26 November 1952 addressed to AD/OSI; Chief, Medical Staff; and Chief [REDACTED] from Security Officer, CIA, subject "Project ARTICHOKE."
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In accordance with discussions at the July and August ARTICHOKE meetings, it is felt that a restatement of the aims of ARTICHOKE is essential at this time, together with a re-definition of the functions of the ARTICHOKE participants. Also included in this restatement will be certain additions to principles stated in above-mentioned memorandum that have been agreed on in meetings of ARTICHOKE representatives during the past several months:
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Aims:
a. Perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis and other elements for the extraction of information from individuals whether willing or not.
b. Provide [REDACTED] field teams for testing, experimenting and refining techniques utilizing currently known and recommended new materials for the extraction of information from indigenous personnel under field conditions.
c. In coordination with [REDACTED] and the Medical Staff arrange for research and experimentation within the facilities of these two components for the development of means for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not.
d. Conduct liaison and initial research in fields and areas not within the immediate capabilities of [REDACTED] and the Medical Staff for the development of ideas and possible means of exerting control over the activities and mental capacities of individuals.
e. Control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve as the support element to the operational components in the use of such technoiques.
f. Explore means through indoctrination and training of preventing the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental capacities of Agency personnel.
g. Serve as the coordinating element among all components for the Agency on those matters concerning the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
h. Arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE techniques and research and development among those elements primarily concerned, as OSI, [REDACTED] Medical Division, [REDACTED] and Security Office.
i. Conduct authorized liaison with other components of government in the ARTICHOKE field, and arrange for liaison responsibility through the Agency component having the most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in other departments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.
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Functions:
a. The Chief, Medical Staff, should be responsible for medical research in support of this project which shall consist of research of a basic and operational nature determined by Chief, Medical Staff, as appropriate and necessary within the scope of his facilities in support of this project. In addition, Chief, Medical Staff, will conduct research and furnish operational support in response to requests by the Security Office and with in the limits of facilities available to the Medical Staff. Requests by the Security office will consist of specific elements of research, materials and personnel in support of operational use of Project ARTICHOKE. The Chief, Medical Staff, will provide medical support for ARTICHOKE field teams.
b. [REDACTED] will conduct, within limitations of their facilities, research in the basic fields of science in support of this project. In addition, [REDACTED] will conduct, within limitations of their facilities, specific research, other than medical, requested by the Security Office in support of operational aspects of Project ARTICHOKE.
c. Liaison with the [REDACTED] in support of this Project will be the responsibility of [REDACTED] under an arrangement already effected by [REDACTED].
d. Responsibility for evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects of Project ARTICHOKE will remain with OSI.
e. Security Office will conduct liaison with the Service components concerned in this problem and in relation to operational aspects of Project ARTICHOKE.
[End of Transcription]
"Artichoke", Special Comments
26 November 1951
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Reference is made to the recent conference in which [REDACTED], yourself, another individual whose name the writer does not recall, and the writer participated concerning the uses of "Artichoke" and special requirements necessary for "Artichoke" in the field.
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Set forth immediately below are certain items which are given for information purposes only and reflect current thinking regarding "Artichoke" insofar as Unit B, I & SO, is concerned.
I. When to use "Artichoke".
A.
Heretofore it has generally been thought that "Artichoke" or the "Artichoke" techniques should only be used as a last resort or when all other means have failed in a particular problem or series of problems. The writer feels that this is not in any sense the only time that "Artichoke" can be used. It is the writer's opinion that "Artichoke" could be considered in three ways.
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The "Artichoke" technique could successfully be used immediately upon the development of a case as a starting point for the obtaining of information
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"Artichoke" could be used At any given point in the development of a case, either to establish new leads or new information or to cross-check or to verify information, names, etc. that have already been obtained.
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"Artichoke" can always be used as a last resort when all or nearly all the attempts at obtaining information have failed or when a subject is completely recalcitrant or particularly stubborn.
II. What General Facilities Should "Artichoke" Have in the Field?
A.
Ideally, "Artichoke" could best be operated in a hospital or a hospital-type area. However, this is generally not possible in view of the present attitude of hospital authorities, military or otherwise.
B.
In the event that hospital-type facilities could not be procured, it would then be best to carry out "Artichoke" operations in a safe house or safe area, but not, in the opinion of the writer, in a military prison, concentration camp, barracks, or similar area.
C.
For technical reasons, it is best to have two adjoining rooms with a bath also adjoining or very close by. The best possible type of room to carry out the actual "Artichoke" techniques is a room in which there is a bed or studio couch or cot and, if possible, this room should be of fairly large size since a crowded room might produce confusion and hinder the development of the "Artichoke" technique.
D.
The adjoining room mentioned above is essential for the setting up of technical equipment, i.e. recording devices, transformers, etc. This room, of course, is also essential as an observation room and listening post for persons interested in the case to make notes and prepare questions as the interrogation develops.
E.
The bathroom is essential for two reasons. The first is that the "Artichoke" doctor in handling the case needs water for various purposes and second is that occasionally ==the "Artichoke" technique produces nausea, vomiting, or other conditions which make bathroom facilities essential. ==
III. Technical Facilities.
A.
IN the opinion [REDACTED] and the writer, technical facilities for assistance in the operation of "ARTICHOKE" in the field have been limited. Hence, it is planned that for the immediate future on any "Artichoke" operation, the "Artichoke" team going from headquarters will either carry with it or send by special shipment, the necessary technical equipment including electronic, chemical, and photographic equipment. However, it would be a valuable contribution to the operation of "Artichoke" if Agency personnel in the field contemplating the use of "Artichoke" would inform headquarters immediately as to exactly what technical equipment is available at that station. Included in this should be a statement as to what type of current is available; whether Variac transformers are available; whether or not the station has a working recorder and, if so what type; (Wire recorders are not regarded as efficient for this type of work) and whether or not certain standard, hospital-type medical supplies can be procured on the scene without difficulty.
IV. Type of Information "Artichoke" Requires Prior to Examining any Given Subject.
A.
As a matter of policy and until "Artichoke" teams are based in field areas, it is essential that "Artichoke" Washington have in its possession all possible information concerning the subject, and either pertinent details prior to "Artichoke" teams leaving for the field.
Set forth below are a list of items that are regarded as essential to the case and exceptionally helpful in determining the necessary "Artichoke" technique to be applied to any individual case.
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A full, detailed, physical description of the subject of subjects to be examined including age, medical history, psychiatric history, any known physical weaknesses, or mental weaknesses or peculiarities. Is he an alcoholic, drug addict, etc.?
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A full biographical background on the subject or subjects in as complete detail as possible. (family, relatives, schooling, travels, jobs, etc.)
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As much information as possible on the details of the case proper, including all collateral matters involved, all areas involved, and, if possible, photographs or descriptions of pertinent individuals, residences, buildings that may be involved in the case.
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A list of, or a carefully worked out plan showing specifically, exactly and in detail just what information is to be obtained from the subject.
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Any details whatsoever that are known of the subjects family, children, relatives, close firends, mistresses, etc., etc.
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Exactly what is the present condition of the subject, i.e. has he been in prison or confinement? If so, for how long? Ha he been in solitary confinement? Has he had standard prison fare? Has he been well-fed or has he been on restricted diet? Has he been subject to any third-degree treatments? Has he been subject to exhaustive interrogation in the immediate past? Has he been threatened with physical injury or worse? Has he ever escaped detention before? Should he be regarded as dangerous?
V. Has the Subject been Polygraphed?
A.
If so, how recent and what questions were asked with what results?
In connection with this, since the members of the "Artichoke" teams are backgrounded in polygraph operation, if possible, the polygraph questions and charts should be made availabel for their examination prior to employing the "Artichoke" techniques.
VI. Guards, Safety Precautions, Etc.
A.
The "Artichoke" team should not be required to be responsible for the guarding of the subject nor for their own physical protection while operating. "Artichoke" team members under no circumstances should have to carry arms or defense weapons of any type. It should be remembered that no infrequently the use of certain chemicals on certain individuals produces results which may produce either extreme physical excitement (mania) or possible suicidal tendencies. These should be guarded against at all times.
In view of the above, competent guards should always be available for this type of work. However, these guards should not be, if at all possible, military personnel, but should in fact be trusted Agency people.
An inherent danger lies in using G1 guards in these cases in view of the fact that the guard may overhear or observe the "Artichoke" technician and although G1 guards could be warned, cautioned, and threatened not to disclose even matters, it would be extremely difficult to guarantee their complete silence.
VII. Personal Effects of the Subject
A.
It is assured, of course, that all the personal effects of the subject will be carefully examined and be held available. This is essential since under certain of the "Artichoke" techniques, these personal effects may be very valuable in obtaining co-operation or making identifications and, of course, for general information purposes.
VIII. Special Points Concerning "Artichoke" Techniques
A.
The ideal
[To be continued maybe...]